Telli V. Broward County-A Misunderstanding Of County Home Rule And An Abridging Of The Status Of The Constitution\u27s County Officers Who Are Not The Charter\u27s County Officers by Vanassenderp, H. Kenza & Scarpone, Kayla M.
Nova Law Review
Volume 39, Issue 1 2014 Article 1
Telli V. Broward County-A Misunderstanding
Of County Home Rule And An Abridging Of
The Status Of The Constitution’s County
Officers Who Are Not The Charter’s County
Officers
H. Kenza Vanassenderp∗ Kayla M. Scarpone†
∗
†
Copyright c©2014 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Telli V. Broward County-A Misunderstanding
Of County Home Rule And An Abridging Of
The Status Of The Constitution’s County
Officers Who Are Not The Charter’s County
Officers
H. Kenza Vanassenderp and Kayla M. Scarpone
Abstract
When a state’s court of last resort renders an opinion that abridges,
ignores, and renders meaningless an express provision of that state’s
constitution, then that court shall have itself effectuated an amendment to its
constitution erroneously and without the approval and longstanding support
of the electors of that state
KEYWORDS: countries, broward, officers
TELLI V. BROWARD COUNTY—A MISUNDERSTANDING OF 
COUNTY HOME RULE AND AN ABRIDGING OF THE STATUS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION’S COUNTY OFFICERS WHO ARE 
NOT THE CHARTER’S COUNTY OFFICERS 
 
H. KENZA VANASSENDERP* & KAYLA M. SCARPONE** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 2 
II. BACKGROUND ON COUNTY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE FLORIDA 
CONSTITUTION ................................................................................... 6 
A. 1968 Constitution and the Shift in Counties’ Home Rule ..... 7 
B. The Difference Between Charter Counties and Non-Charter 
Counties Under the Florida Constitution. ............................ 8 
C. Status of the Constitution’s “County Officers” (art. VIII, 
section 1, subsection (d)) .................................................... 11 
1. No Charter Regulation of, or Interference with, the 
Florida Constitution’s Five Independent County 
Officers .................................................................. 14 
2. In Order to Have Charter Regulation and Control, 
the Constitution’s County Office Must Be 
Abolished, and Its Duties Transferred to a Charter’s 
County Office, Either Charter-Appointed or Charter-
Elected ................................................................... 15 
3. Charter Counties Have Broader Power to Regulate 
Its County Commissioners ..................................... 17 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TELLI V. BROWARD COUNTY ............................ 18 
                                                            
* Ken vanAssenderp, Vice-President of Young vanAssenderp, P.A., is a 1963 
graduate of the Florida State University and obtained his J.D. degree in 1972 from the 
Cumberland School of Law at Samford University.  In 1974, he was appointed by Governor 
Reuben Askew to the New Communities Task Force, which led to the New Communities Act 
of 1975, and in 2000, was appointed by Governor Jeb Bush to serve on the Governor’s Select 
Elections Reform Task Force after the Bush-Gore election to assess how to reform election 
standards, technology, and procedures.  Mr. vanAssenderp has represented the Florida Tax 
Collectors Association since 1974, and has served as its General Counsel since 1978.  He has 
advised and counseled Tax Collectors and other local officials on their status under the Florida 
Constitution since 1974.  He also represents independent special districts including 
community development district and similar ones created by special acts that he drafted. 
** Kayla M. Scarpone is a 2011 graduate of the Florida State University and 
obtained her J.D. degree from Florida State University College of Law in 2014.  Ms. Scarpone 
clerked for Young vanAssenderp, P.A. from 2012 to 2014.  Ms. Scarpone is currently clerking 
for the Honorable Mary S. Scriven, United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida. 
1
Vanassenderp and Scarpone: Telli V. Broward County-A Misunderstanding Of County Home Rule An
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
A. County Home Rule .............................................................. 18 
B. Supreme Court of Florida Decision .................................... 20 
1. The Telli Decision is in Direct Contradiction to the 
Provisions of Article VIII, Section 1, Subsection (d) 
of the Florida Constitution ..................................... 21 
a. Additional Critiques of Reliance on Justice 
Anstead’s Dissent in Cook II .................... 24 
IV. PATHWAYS TO REVIEW:  WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE? .......... 30 
A. Constitutional Amendment .................................................. 31 
B. Review of District Court of Appeal Decision ...................... 31 
C. Writ of Quo Warranto ......................................................... 32 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 34 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When a state’s court of last resort renders an opinion that abridges, 
ignores, and renders meaningless an express provision of that state’s 
constitution, then that court shall have itself effectuated an amendment to its 
constitution erroneously and without the approval and longstanding support 
of the electors of that state.1  This is what the Supreme Court of Florida did 
in 2012 in the case of Telli v. Broward County,2 which held that counties 
should be allowed “to govern themselves, including [enacting] term limits 
[for] their officials, in accordance with their home rule authority.”3  It is 
being interpreted to opine that charter counties may impose term limits 
through their charters on any and all county officers—including the 
Constitution’s County Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution, which includes the office of the 
Tax Collector.4  This recent Supreme Court of Florida opinion receded 
from—that is, determined that the Court would no longer abide by—its 
previous opinion in Cook v. City of Jacksonville (Cook II),5 issued ten years 
prior, which expressly and unambiguously held that charter counties could 
not limit the terms of the Constitution’s five County Officers enumerated in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution.6 
                                                            
1. See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
2. 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
3. Id. at 513 (emphasis added). 
4. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
5. 823 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 2002). 
6. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook v. 
City of Jacksonville (Cook II), 823 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 2002); City of Jacksonville v. Cook 
(Cook I), 765 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook 
v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 
2002). 
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The decision in Telli, which is supported by scarce legal analysis, is 
in direct conflict with the Florida Constitution.7  Telli represents a 
fundamental misunderstanding of charter counties’ home rule power—as 
limited by the Florida Constitution—and also a misunderstanding of the 
status of the five County Officers created and established by article VIII, 
section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution.8 
Another article has been published regarding this case in 2013 by 
Daniel S. Weinger, titled Stare Decisis Takes Another Blow in Telli v. 
Broward County.9  We would like to note that we agree with Mr. Weinger’s 
position regarding the past precedent leading up to Telli, and his discussion 
of stare decisis.10  We do, however, respectfully disagree with his discussion 
of operative language of the Constitutional provisions pertaining to “County 
Officers” and “County Commissioners”—discussed more fully below.11  
Furthermore, we note that Mr. Weinger’s article did not address several 
important issues with the case.12 
Florida is divided into sixty-seven county political subdivisions, each 
served by one general purpose government entity—Board of County 
Commissioners—and five specific purpose one-officer entities, the 
Constitution’s County Officers:  Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser, 
Supervisor of Elections, and Clerk of Circuit Court.13  All county 
governments have home rule power under the Florida Constitution, 
regardless of whether they take form as a charter county government form of 
home rule, or non-charter county government form of home rule.14  Home 
rule—ever since 1968—is vested inherently in each county.15  However, the 
Constitution still provides limitations on county home rule.16  There are two 
                                                            
7. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506, 512–13; Daniel S. 
Weinger, Stare Decisis Takes Another Blow in Telli v. Broward County, 42 STETSON L. REV. 
859, 859–60 (2013). 
8. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506, 512–13; Weinger, 
supra note 7, at 859, 868–69. 
9. Weinger, supra note 7, at 859, 868–73. 
10. Id. at 860–68. 
11. See infra text accompanying note 119.  Interestingly enough, Mr. Weinger 
served as co-appellate counsel for the Board of County Commissioners challenging the term 
limit provision in the Telli case.  Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505–06; Weinger, supra note 7, at 859. 
12. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505–13; Weinger, supra note 7, at 868–73. 
13. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), (c)–(d), (f)–(g) (noting unless one or more 
offices in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) is abolished under applicable constitutional 
authority).  Although much of this article will focus on duties and provisions of the Tax 
Collector, the broader implications are applicable to all five of the Constitution’s County 
Officers.  Id.  See infra Parts II.C., III.A.–B. 
14. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), (f)–(g). 
15. See id. § 1(a). 
16. See id. § 1(f)–(g). 
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categories of such limitations, which include those limits on non-charter 
counties’ home rule in article VIII, section 1, subsection (f), and those limits 
on charter counties’ home rule in article VIII, section 1, subsection (g).17 
The Constitution’s five County Officers18—as created by and 
established under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida 
Constitution—have been imbued with sovereignty and maintain a status of 
independence from the county government, the Board of County 
Commissioners.19  These officers maintain sovereign plenary power to carry 
out important state work assigned to them by general law to be performed 
and carried out at the county level and to exercise reasonable discretion in 
carrying out that work, not inconsistent with the express duties.20  These 
officers are not subject to regulation or interference by the local county 
government—the Board of County Commissioners.21  Therefore, any charter 
provisions pertaining to the Constitution’s five County Officers will not be 
enforceable, save for a provision establishing a different manner for their 
selection—but being selected in a different manner does not change their 
status as the Constitution’s County Officers.22 
                                                            
17. Id. 
18. Id. § 1(d).  It is important to understand the terms that we have chosen to 
describe the five County Officers listed in, and created by, article VIII, section 1, subsection 
(d) of the Florida Constitution.  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  Throughout this article, we 
refer to these officers as the “Constitution’s County Officers.”  Id.  This is because they are 
created by the Constitution.  Id.  Some cases have referred to them as “Constitutional County 
Officers,” “Constitutionally-authorized County Officers,” or some other related title.  See, 
e.g., Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418–19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. 
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 
2012).  We believe referring to these officers as either “Constitutional” or “Constitutionally-
authorized” is misleading.  See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418–19.  
These titles have been used by the courts to distinguish the five article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d), county officers from a charter-created officer to whom the duties of the article 
VIII, section 1, subsection (d) County Officer have been transferred, and which may retain the 
same name and responsibilities.  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  For a more detailed discussion 
of the abolition of an article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) officer and the transfer of his or her 
duties, resulting in a charter officer, see infra Part II.C.  However, if a charter county follows 
the correct procedures laid out in the Constitution under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) 
to abolish a Constitution-created “County Office” and transfers its duties to a charter-created 
office, then the resulting charter office is also constitutional.  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see 
infra Part II.C.  To avoid confusion, we refer to the article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) 
“County Officers,” as created by the Constitution, as the “Constitution’s County Officers” or 
“Constitution County Officer,” and to any charter-created office carrying out the same duties 
after abolition and transfer as the “charter’s county officer.”  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see 
infra Parts II–V. 
19. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e). 
20. See id. § 1(f). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. § 1(d). 
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A charter county may abolish one or more of the Constitution’s five 
County Offices and transfer the duties performed by that office to a charter 
office—either charter-elected or charter-appointed.23  For example, in the 
Miami-Dade, Broward, and Volusia county political subdivisions, the 
Constitution’s County Tax Collector—even though it may be referred to by 
the same name under the charter—no longer exists.24  The charter’s 
appointed Tax Collector now exists in its place in these counties, and this 
charter office may be regulated to its fullest extent by the local government, 
not inconsistent with the state duties established under Chapter 197 of the 
Florida Statutes,25 and other applicable general law.26 
The recent Supreme Court of Florida decision in Telli is in direct 
contradiction with the above-summarized provisions of the Florida 
Constitution.27  First, it fails to acknowledge the important limitations placed 
on counties’ home rule power under the Constitution.28  Second, it 
undermines completely the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers 
by holding that charter counties may term limit any and all county officers 
through their charters—even the Constitution’s County Officers—when 
those offices have not been first abolished under the county charter.29 
Accordingly, the lower court decision from the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal in the case should have been affirmed, but on different grounds:  
(1) because charter counties have broad authority over their Board of County 
Commissioners and any of their charter-elected or charter-appointed officers 
under their charters, including the authority to set term limits on the charters’ 
officers—including County Commissioners—and; (2) because counties do 
not have the authority to regulate or interfere with the Constitution’s five 
County Officers and thus do not have the power to term limit any one of the 
Constitution’s County Officers whose office has not been abolished and 
duties transferred to a charter-created office.30  Regardless of what the 
                                                            
23. Id. 
24. DADE COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER art. IX, § 9.01(A) (2012); BROWARD 
COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 3.06(a) (2010); VOLUSIA COUNTY CHARTER art.VI, § 601.1(1)(a) 
(2002); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
25. FLA. STAT. § 197.332(2) (2014); see also DADE COUNTY HOME RULE 
CHARTER art. IX, § 9.01; BROWARD COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 3.06; VOLUSIA COUNTY 
CHARTER art.VI, § 601.1. 
26. Weinger, supra note 7, at 862–63. 
27. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g), with Telli v. Broward Cnty., 
94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
28. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 507; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g). 
29. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g). 
30. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Snipes v. 
Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward 
Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012). 
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Supreme Court of Florida held in the Telli opinion, county charter term limits 
are not effective as to the Constitution’s County Officers.31 
The following sections of this article will explore the preceding 
analysis in depth.32  Part II will include important background on county 
governance under the Florida Constitution, including the development of the 
county home rule in Florida, the difference between charter and non-charter 
county governance, and the status that our Florida Constitution gives to the 
five Constitution County Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d), as well as the relationship between charter and non-charter 
counties and the Constitution’s County Officers in each of their respective 
counties.33  Part III will include an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court of 
Florida decision in Telli, and how that decision misinterprets county home 
rule and ignores the status of the Constitution’s County Officers.34  Part IV 
includes a discussion of some possible pathways of review.35 
II. BACKGROUND ON COUNTY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE FLORIDA 
CONSTITUTION 
The Florida Constitution provides that the state shall be divided into 
political subdivisions called counties.36  The Constitution leaves it up to the 
Florida Legislature to determine the number and boundaries of such 
counties.37  Currently, there are sixty-seven counties in Florida.38 
The Constitution also establishes that there shall be one county 
government in each county political subdivision and provides that such 
county governments exercise home rule power, either in the form of a non-
charter county government39 or charter county government.40  However, the 
Constitution also provides that there shall be six more distinct government 
entities that shall be integral to that county’s political subdivision.41  These 
include one collegial, general purpose entity in the form of the Board of 
                                                            
31. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
32. See infra Parts II–IV. 
33. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); infra Part II. 
34. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; infra Part III. 
35. See infra Part IV. 
36. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) (“The state shall be divided by law into 
political subdivisions called counties.”). 
37. Id. (“Counties may be created, abolished or changed by law, with 
provision for payment or apportionment of the public debt.”). 
38. See FLA. STAT. ch. 7 (2014). 
39. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (f). 
40. Id. § 1(g). 
41. Id. § 1(d)–(e). 
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County Commissioners42 and each of the five distinct one-officer, special 
purpose entities, which include:  Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser, 
Supervisor of Elections, and Clerk of Court.43  These five, one-officer, 
special purpose entities are created by the Florida Constitution—labeled 
“County Officers”—and exist in every county political subdivision in 
Florida; even in counties that have adopted charters, unless any charter 
county has by charter provision abolished such an office and transferred its 
duties to either a charter-elected or charter-appointed office.44 
A. 1968 Constitution and the Shift in Counties’ Home Rule 
“Home rule” generally refers to the “allocati[on] [of] a measure of 
autonomy to a local government.”45  In other words, a local government that 
has home rule power governs its own local affairs and does not have to seek 
legislative authority for what it does.46  Prior to the 1968 Constitution, 
counties in Florida derived home rule authority only as directly granted from 
the Florida Legislature “through [the] passage of local bills,”47 and did not 
have any independent or inherent powers of self-government.48  This 
previous form of home rule in Florida was commonly referred to as Dillon’s 
Rule.49  Based on the increasing population and growth needs of the people 
                                                            
42. Id. § 1(e). 
43. Id. § 1(d). 
44. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  There are certain limited ways, provided by 
the Constitution, in which a charter county government may alter or abolish one or more of 
these six county government entities, which will be discussed in Part II.C.1–3.  See discussion 
infra Part II.C.1–3. 
45. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (10th ed. 2014).  The verbatim definition 
in Black’s Law Dictionary is “[a] state legislative provision or action allocating a measure of 
autonomy to a local government, conditional on its acceptance of certain terms.”  Id.  This 
definition is somewhat misleading because, as discussed infra, in Florida, home rule power is 
allocated under the State’s constitution, and therefore, is not an allocation of power from the 
legislature, but an inherent power based on the consent of the people to be governed.  See 
discussion infra Part III.A. 
46. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f)–(g); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 45, at 850. 
47. C. Wayne Alford & John H. Wolf, Comment, Constitutional Revision:  
County Home Rule in Florida—The Need for Expansion, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 282, 282–83 
(1966). 
48. Mark J. Wolff, Home Rule in Florida:  A Critical Appraisal, 19 STETSON 
L. REV. 853, 859 (1990). 
49. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 169, 221 (1983) (discussing Dillon’s Rule, under which “local government[s 
only] consisted of delegated or enumerated powers,” and thus characterizing “local 
governments as creatures of the state legislature”). 
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of Florida,50 and the increasing demands that the passage of local bills were 
placing on the Legislature,51 the people of Florida passed the 1968 
Constitution which includes express provisions addressing the home rule 
power of county political subdivisions.52  The fundamental force of these 
provisions of the 1968 Constitution meant that counties in Florida have 
inherent governing power and no longer have to request a specific law from 
the Florida Legislature to justify or authorize local county action.53  Broad as 
this power may be, the Constitution still limits this inherent power with 
different limitations for non-charter home rule and charter county home 
rule.54 
B. The Difference Between Charter Counties and Non-Charter 
Counties Under the Florida Constitution 
All sixty-seven county political subdivisions in Florida possess home 
rule power inherently, regardless of whether they have a charter or not.55  
Under the 1968 Constitution, non-charter counties possess “such power of 
self-government as is provided by general56 or special law57 . . . [and] [t]he 
[B]oard of [C]ounty [C]ommissioners . . . may enact . . . county ordinances 
not inconsistent with general or special law.”58  Relatedly, charter county 
                                                            
50. See Wolff, supra note 48, at 854 (“It is a practical response to persistent 
increases in demand for fundamental services such as water, sewage, transportation, zoning, 
and police and fire protection, precipitated by steadily increasing populations . . . .”). 
51. See, e.g., Alford & Wolf, supra note 47, at 283 (stating that “[i]n 1965, the 
Florida Legislature passed 1186 special and local bills,” dwarfing the number of general bills 
it passed, at a mere 586). 
52. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f), (g). 
53. See Wolff, supra note 48, at 861–62. 
54. Id. at 881; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f), (g). 
55. Wolff, supra note 48, at 880. 
56. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155, 1157 
(Fla. 1989).  A general law is one that “operates universally throughout the state, uniformly 
upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within a permissible 
classification.”  Id. (citing State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla. 1934) (en 
banc)). 
57. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(g).  The Constitution defines a “special law” as a 
special or local law.  Id. 
“[A] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons 
or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when 
classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is 
one relating to, or designed to, operate only in a specifically indicated part of the 
State, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification 
is not permissible or the classification is illegal.” 
City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 148 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Landis, 163 So. at 240 
(emphasis omitted)). 
58. FLA. CONST. art VIII, § 1(f). 
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governments possess “all powers of local self-government not inconsistent 
with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors,” and 
the Board of County Commissioners “may enact county ordinances not 
inconsistent with general law.”59 
Fundamentally, all counties—whether charter or non-charter—
possess inherent home rule power, and the only fundamental difference 
between the home rule power of charter counties and non-charter counties is 
the limitations placed upon them.60  For all counties in Florida, home rule 
power is limited by both general law enactments of the Florida Legislature 
and the provisions of the Florida Constitution; but in non-charter counties, 
home rule is also limited further by special law enactments of the Florida 
Legislature.61 
The Florida Legislature has provided broad powers of local self-
governance to all counties through general law by enacting the provisions of 
chapter 125 of the Florida Statutes.62  Essentially, chapter 125 of the Florida 
Statutes operates as a quasi-default charter for non-charter counties, but is 
used in practice by charter counties as well.63  The provisions that exist for 
non-charter counties under chapter 125 are very broad and non-restrictive.64 
In essence, under current law, there are several things that counties 
can accomplish under the charter county government structure that either 
cannot be accomplished, or can only be accomplished indirectly, under non-
charter county government structure.65  Examples include: 
 
1) Citizen recall enabling voters of the county to vote to 
remove members of the Board of County Commissioners;66 
2) Citizen initiatives to vote on proposed ordinances;67 
                                                            
59. Id. § 1(g) (emphasis added).  This distinction between powers of self-
government and local self-government has not been defined.  See id.  However, we would 
argue that it means that non-charter home rule is limited to self-government, and charter home 
rule has a further limitation in that it is limited to local self-government.  Id.  Therefore, a 
charter cannot write anything that is not truly local in nature.  Id. 
60. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f)–(g). 
61. Id. § 1(g); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 850; see also FLA. 
STAT. ch. 125 (2014).  Those special law enactments passed by the Florida Legislature will 
only apply to charter counties if the voters in the county also pass it by referendum.  FLA. 
CONST. art. III, § 10.  “Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of local 
self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the 
electors.”  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g) (emphasis added). 
62. See FLA. STAT. ch. 125. 
63. See id. 
64. See id.; 081-7 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 24 (1981). 
65. See FLA. STAT. ch. 125. 
66. See id. § 100.361(1). 
67. See id. § 125.66(4)(b)(1). 
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3) Non-partisan elections of the Board of County 
Commissioners;68 
4) Term limits for the Board of County Commissioners;69 
5) Change in the length of terms for the Board of County 
Commissioners;70 
6) Change in the districts represented by each County 
Commissioner, including at-large districts;71 
7) County ordinances to prevail in the event of conflict 
with and over municipal ordinances on the same subject;72 
8) Exclusive power in the county over community 
redevelopment authorities with tax increment financing;73 
9) County authority to levy a municipal public service tax 
outside of a city in the county;74 
10) Levy of a communication service tax at a higher rate;75 
11) Abolish any of the State Constitution’s County 
Officers—Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser, Supervisor 
of Elections, and Clerk of Court—and then transfer the duties to 
a charter-created office in order to put them under the control of 
the Board of County Commissioners;76 and/or 
                                                            
68. See 00-02 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 6 (2000). 
69. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).  This 
is in line with the holding of Telli, and an interpretation of article VIII, section 1, subsection 
(e) of the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.  
However, the holding of Telli, with respect to term limits of the Constitution’s five County 
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution, is 
erroneous and in contradiction to the provisions and structure of the Florida Constitution.  See 
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.  For full discussion of this issue, see 
infra Part III.B. 
70. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (“Except when otherwise provided by 
county charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners 
composed of five or seven members serving staggered terms of four years.”) (emphasis 
added). 
71. See FLA. STAT. § 124.01(4). 
72. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f) (For non-charter county governments “an 
ordinance in conflict with a municipal ordinance shall not be effective within the municipality 
to the extent of such conflict.”); id. § 1(g) (For charter county governments:  “The charter 
shall provide which shall prevail in the event of conflict between county and municipal 
ordinances.”). 
73. See FLA. STAT. § 163.410. 
74. See id. § 166.231(1)(c). 
75. See id. § 202.19(1). 
76. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); infra Part II.C.2. 
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12) Have special acts of the Legislature to be inapplicable 
within the county unless approved by referendum.77 
C. Status of the Constitution’s “County Officers” (art. VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d)) 
In Amos v. Mathews,78 a Supreme Court of Florida decision rendered 
prior to the 1968 Constitution, the Court described the division of power and 
duties of state and local officers as such: 
 
It is fundamentally true that all local powers must have 
their origin in a grant by the state which is the fountain and source 
of authority. . . .  [I]t is therefore the spirit of the Constitution, that 
the performance of state functions shall be confided to state 
officers; the performance of county functions of purely local 
concern shall be confided to county officers.  Save as is otherwise 
clearly contemplated by the Constitution, there can be no 
compromise with that principle, the origin of which is more 
ancient than the Constitution itself.79 
 
As noted above, prior to 1968, any and all county officers had the 
power to govern local affairs only to the extent that home rule power was 
granted to them by the Legislature.80 
However, that power structure changed as a result of the 1968 
Constitution, which vested in non-charter counties such powers of self-
governing by general or special law, and in charter counties “all powers of 
local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law 
approved by vote of the electors.”81  In essence, this change “denotes a broad 
empowerment of local authorities to . . . rule[] in matters of genuine local 
concern,” and “shift[ed] [to] locus of decision-making power back to those 
in the best position to assess those needs, freeing the state legislature to 
concentrate on the issues that have a genuine statewide impact.”82 
                                                            
77. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g) (“Counties 
operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not 
inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors.”) 
(emphasis added). 
78. 126 So. 308 (Fla. 1930). 
79. Id. at 320. 
80. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 27; Louis C. Deal, Constitutional 
Home Rule of Unchartered Counties—Fantasy or Fact?, 56 FLA. B. J. 469, 469 (1982); Wolff, 
supra note 48, at 859–60. 
81. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g). 
82. Wolff, supra note 48, at 854 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the division of state and local powers under the 1968 
Constitution allows for local regulation of purely local officers, and state 
regulation of state officers.83  The Constitution’s County Officers listed in 
and created only by article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), hold an 
independent status in our state and Constitution.84  They are not local officers 
with purely local duties as defined in Amos, but rather they are the state 
Constitution’s sovereign County Officers with plenary power to implement 
important state duties under state law and state rule on the local level.85 
Although the five officers listed in article VIII, section 1, subsection 
(d) are labeled County Officers, they are the Constitution’s County Officers 
in and for each county political subdivision and they hold a constitutional 
sovereign status.86  This sovereign status is of special consequence and 
benefit to Floridians because of the important state work that these 
Constitution County Officers perform on the county level, which is an 
overriding State interest and—notwithstanding dicta in court and Attorney 
General opinions—is not county business.87  The sovereign status of these 
officers is well explained in Demings v. Orange County Citizens Review 
Board88 as follows: 
 
[U]nder Florida’s [C]onstitution, certain responsibilities of local 
governance are separately entrusted to independent constitutional 
officers who, at least in non-charter counties [who have not 
abolished the Constitution’s County Officers], are not accountable 
to the county’s governing board, but derive their power directly 
                                                            
83. Amos, 126 So. at 320; Deal, supra note 80, at 469; Wolff, supra note 48, 
at 859–60; see also FLA CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
84. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
85. See id. § 1(g); Amos, 126 So. at 308, 320.  The best example of state 
duties performed by the tax collectors is property tax collection.  See FLA. STAT. § 197.603 
(2014) (“The Legislature finds that the state has a strong interest in ensuring due process and 
public confidence in a uniform, fair, efficient, and accountable collection of property taxes by 
county tax collectors. . . . The Legislature intends that the property tax collection authorized 
by this chapter under [section] 9(a), [a]rt. VII of the State Constitution be free from the 
influence or the appearance of influence of the local governments that levy property taxes and 
receive property tax revenues.” (emphasis added)).  Other state duties include:  Title, tag, and 
driver’s license services, sale of hunting and fishing licenses, collection of other taxes on the 
local level, including those levied by state agencies.  FLA. STAT. §§ 320.03, 322.135, 
379.352(4). 
86. Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
87. Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
88. 15 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
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from the state.  These officers are independently accountable to the 
electorate unless otherwise provided by law.89 
 
In this context, the term local governance refers to the important 
state duties performed locally by the Constitution’s County Officers elected 
in each county’s political subdivision.90  The sovereign independence of the 
Constitution’s County Officers is important and is set up by our Constitution 
to eliminate even the appearance—much less the reality—of local influence 
on the important state work performed by these officers on the county 
level.91  The independence and election of the Constitution’s County Officers 
maintains service and accountability only to the electorate in the local county 
political subdivision and not to the interests of the local general purpose 
collegial governing body that would benefit from exercising undue influence 
and political control over these offices to the detriment of the people and to 
the detriment of the people’s interest in due process, unfettered even, by the 
appearance of influence by those who tax and spend.92 
The Constitution’s five County Officers have been imbued with 
sovereignty.93  Sovereignty refers to the supreme political authority of an 
independent state;94 or, in other words, a state’s “authority and . . . right to 
govern itself.”95  In the United States, the fifty individual states have retained 
all of their common law sovereign powers, save those that were relinquished 
to the federal government.96  In Florida, state officers are imbued with a 
                                                            
89. Id. at 606 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
90. See id. 
91. See FLA. STAT. § 197.603. 
The Legislature finds that the state has a strong interest in ensuring due process and 
public confidence in a uniform, fair, efficient, and accountable collection of 
property taxes by county tax collectors.  Therefore, tax collections shall be 
supervised by the Department of Revenue pursuant to [section] 195.002(1).  The 
Legislature intends that the property tax collection authorized by this chapter under 
[section] 9(a), [article] VII of the State Constitution be free from the influence or 
the appearance of influence of the local governments that levy property taxes and 
receive property tax revenues. 
Id. 
92. See id.; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606; John B. Anderson et al., Presidential 
Elections—The Right to Vote and Access to the Ballot, 29 NOVA L. REV. 571, 580–81 (2005). 
93. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 610–11. 
94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (10th ed. 2014) (“The supreme political 
authority of an independent state.”). 
95. Sovereignty Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sovereignty (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (“[A] country’s independent 
authority and the right to govern itself.”). 
96. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n, 
2009) (“[T]he State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they 
before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.”); 
Anderson et al., supra note 92, at 580–81. 
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portion of state sovereignty.97  Similarly, the state Constitution’s County 
Officers, including the County Tax Collectors, are also imbued with state 
sovereignty.98  The Supreme Court of Florida has described the relationship 
between the state and its officers as such: 
 
“The term office implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign 
power to, and possession of it by, the person filling the office; a 
public office being an agency for the state, and the person whose 
duty it is to perform the agency being a public officer.  The term 
embraces the idea of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties, and 
has respect to a permanent public trust to be exercised [on] behalf 
of government, and not to a merely transient, occasional, or 
incidental employment.  A person, in the service of the 
government, who derives his position from a duly and legally 
authorized election or appointment, whose duties are continuous in 
their nature, and defined by rules prescribed by government, and 
not by contract, consisting of the exercise of important public 
powers, trusts, or duties, as a part of the regular administration of 
the government, the place and the duties remaining, though the 
incumbent dies or is changed, . . . is a public officer . . . every 
office, in the constitutional meaning of the term, impl[ies] an 
authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power, either in 
making, executing, or administering the laws.”99 
 
Therefore, the Constitution’s five County Officers have been imbued 
with the sovereign authority of the state and, as such, shall carry out their 
duties on behalf of the people of the State of Florida, free from local 
influence and interference.100 
1. No Charter Regulation of, or Interference with, the Florida 
Constitution’s Five Independent County Officers 
Because of the sovereign independence of the Constitution’s article 
VIII, section 1, subsection (d) County Officers, and the important public 
policy reasons for maintaining such independence, the general purpose 
collegial local county government—made up of the Board of County 
Commissioners—cannot regulate or interfere with a Constitution’s County 
                                                            
97. State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 22 So. 721, 723 (Fla. 1897). 
98. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722.  This state 
sovereignty is also abolished when the Constitution’s County Office is abolished by a county 
charter.  See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part 
II.C.2. 
99. Clyatt, 22 So. at 723 (emphasis added). 
100. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722. 
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Officer in any way, even in a charter county.101  The Constitution does state 
one very limited way in which a county charter can regulate the 
Constitution’s County Officers.102  Under the Constitution, article VIII, 
section 1, subsection (d), Officers are to be “elected by the electors of each 
county;” in other words, this is the default manner in which Constitution 
County Officers are chosen.103  Alternatively, the Constitution also states that 
“when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of the 
electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner 
therein specified.”104  This limited exception would allow a charter county—
under its charter or by special act approved by the voters in the county—to 
change the manner or method in which the Constitution’s County Officers 
are chosen.105  An example is that one or more of these five Constitution 
County Officers could be chosen by the majority of the local Board of 
County Commissioners.106  However, this exception is limited expressly, in 
that, even if a charter county changes the manner in which the Constitution’s 
County Officers are chosen, they still remain the Constitution’s County 
Officers, with plenary power and sovereign authority, and therefore shall not 
be subject to the control of the county government.107 
2. In Order to Have Charter Regulation and Control, the Constitution’s 
County Office Must Be Abolished, and Its Duties Transferred to a Charter’s 
County Office, Either Charter-Appointed or Charter-Elected 
The Constitution also allows a charter county—through its charter, 
or through a special act approved by the charter county voters—to abolish 
completely one or more of the Constitution’s article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d) County Officers, and transfer the duties of that office to a 
charter-created office.108  At that point, the Constitution’s office, which was 
                                                            
101. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722; 081-7 Fla. Op. 
Att’y Gen. 21 (1981) (stating that County Officers retain their status as constitutional County 
Officers unless abolished by charter). 
 102. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. (emphasis added). 
105. Id. 
106. Id.; see also In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 313 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla. 
1975). 
107. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 313 So. 
2d at 720–21. 
108. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see also In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 
313 So. 2d. at 720 (“There shall be elected by the electors of each county, for terms of four 
years, a sheriff, a tax collector, [a property appraiser], a supervisor of elections, and a clerk of 
the circuit court; except, when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of 
the electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner therein 
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abolished, is no longer the Constitution’s County Office—even though the 
new county charter office may use the same name—and therefore no longer 
enjoys the same independence and plenary power of a sovereign office to 
carry out the important state duties delegated by the Legislature with 
insulation from influence of the local government.109  The office is thus 
transformed into a non-sovereign charter county office—either elected or 
appointed—and is open to complete regulation and control by the county 
government.110 
It is important to note though, that abolition of one or more of the 
Constitution’s five County Offices and the transfer of each office’s duties to 
a charter-created office are not by any means mandatory for counties that 
possess charters.111  Rather, it is an option that can be exercised.112  This 
concept was well explained by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Demings, 
when it stated:  “In charter counties, the electorate has an option of either 
maintaining these independent constitutional offices or abolishing them and 
transferring their responsibilities to the board of the charter county or to local 
offices created by the charter.”113  Thus, as long as the Constitution’s County 
Office is maintained in a charter county and has not been abolished and its 
duties transferred—using express language of abolition and transfer—the 
county government is without the power to regulate the office, except to the 
                                                                                                                                            
specified, or any county office may be abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by 
general law are transferred to another office.”) (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1(d)). 
109. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens 
Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
110. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Dade Cnty. v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822, 
823–24 (Fla. 1963) (holding that “although it may be bad government,” Dade County had the 
power to regulate its charter sheriff under the provisions of its county home rule charter); State 
ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So. 2d 312, 316 (Fla. 1961) (stating that charter tax assessor 
retained all the same duties as a constitutional tax assessor under the charter, the only 
difference was that “his political life and death depend upon the county commissioners”); 
Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.  Additionally, section 125.63 of the Florida Statutes also indicates 
that before proposing a charter, a charter commission be formed which “shall conduct a 
comprehensive study of the operation of county government and of the ways in which the 
conduct of county government might be improved or reorganized.”  FLA. STAT. § 125.63 
(2014).  While there is no similar specific requirement for adoption of proposed charter 
amendments, this provision does indicate to us that charter governments should only make 
changes upon a finding that such changes will actually improve the conduct and operation of 
state and county government on the county level.  See id. 
111. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
112. See id. 
113. Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606 (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1(d). 
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limited extent of dictating the manner in which the Constitution’s County 
Officer will be chosen.114 
It is helpful to understand the terminology used in this discussion 
and related case law.  The Constitution is the organic base jurisdictional 
authority created by the people.115  Any officer created by it—for example, 
Governor, Legislator, or the Tax Collector—is the Constitution’s officer.116  
It is a Constitution office, not a charter office.117  If, in a county charter, the 
Constitution’s County Office of Tax Collector, Sheriff, Property Appraiser, 
Supervisor of Elections, or Clerk of Court is abolished, and its duties 
transferred to a charter-elected or charter-appointed office, then the 
Constitution’s office is gone and the replacement office is the charter’s 
office.118  If the Constitution’s substantive procedural requirements are 
followed, then the charter’s office was created constitutionally, but 
nonetheless is no longer the Constitution’s County Officer—and thus, no 
longer enjoys the independence and plenary power of a state sovereign 
officer.119 
3. Charter Counties Have Broader Power to Regulate Its County 
Commissioners 
Unlike the provisions pertaining to the Constitution’s five County 
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), the provisions 
pertaining to County Commissioners in article VIII, section 1, subsection (e), 
are open to broader regulation through county charters.120  Although the two 
provisions both contain the same operative language, “‘[e]xcept when 
otherwise provided by county charter,’” the placement of that language is 
important.121  In section 1, subsection (d), the operative language appears 
                                                            
114. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see also Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. 
115. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
116. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
117. See id.; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. 
118. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. 
119. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. 
120. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e). 
Commissioners.  Except when otherwise provided by county charter, the governing 
body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners composed of five or 
seven members serving staggered terms of four years.  After each decennial census 
the board of county commissioners shall divide the county into districts of 
contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable.  One commissioner 
residing in each district shall be elected as provided by law. 
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added). 
121. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e); Weinger, supra note 7, at 869 (quoting 
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(d)–(e)).  One author, in a recently published article, argued that there 
is no distinction between the levels of regulation by county charters of Constitution County 
Officers and County Commissioners because the two Florida constitutional provisions contain 
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after the language enumerating the Constitution’s five different County 
Officers and their method of election and terms, and before the two specific 
alteration provisions, discussed above in subsections (a) and (b).122  In 
section 1, subsection (e), the operative language is placed at the beginning of 
the entire provision, signaling a broader power to regulate, because any of 
the provisions that follow may be altered by a county charter.123  This 
wording is in stark contrast to section 1, subsection (d), where the placement 
of the operative language indicates that only certain specific and limited 
alterations can be made by a county charter.124 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TELLI V. BROWARD COUNTY 
A. County Home Rule 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Telli held that charter counties had 
the power to term limit—or disqualify—any and all county officers.125  This 
holding was founded upon the Court’s finding that its prior decision of City 
of Jacksonville v. Cook (Cook I)126, “undermines the ability of counties to 
govern themselves as that broad authority has been granted to them by home 
rule power through the Florida Constitution.”127 
Many court opinions and law review articles repeatedly refer to 
counties’ home rule power under the 1968 Constitution as a grant of power, 
but it is more properly characterized as an inherent, but limited power.128  In 
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County,129 the Fourth District described the 
origin of county home rule power.130  First, the court stated that: 
 
[C]harter counties . . . derive their sovereign powers from the state 
through [a]rticle VIII, [s]ection 1(g) [which states]:  “Counties 
operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-
                                                                                                                                            
the exact same language “‘except[] when [otherwise] provided by county charter.’”  Weinger, 
supra note 7, at 869.  However, this argument is incomplete as it failed to analyze placement 
of the phrase.  See Weinger, supra note 7, at 869–70. 
122. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a)–(b), (d). 
123. Id. § 1(e). 
124. Id. § 1(d). 
125. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
126.  765 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, 
Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 
86 (Fla. 2002). 
127. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505; Cook I, 765 So. 2d at 293. 
128. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g); e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 
431 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
129. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
130. Id. at 609. 
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government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law 
approved by the vote of the electors.  The governing body of a 
county operating under a charter may enact county ordinances not 
inconsistent with general law.”131 
 
The Court then went on to state that “[t]hrough this provision, the 
people of Florida have vested broad home rule powers in charter counties 
such as Broward County,” and that the counties possess all the powers of 
self-government unless preempted by state general law, and that the power is 
also limited by the Florida Constitution.132  The Second District echoed these 
limitations on county home rule power in Pinellas County v. City of Largo.133 
In one case predating the 1968 Constitution, the Supreme Court of 
Florida—in describing the power of the Legislature under the Florida 
Constitution—stated that “it should further be borne in mind that our State 
Constitution is not a grant of power to the Legislature, but is a limitation 
voluntarily imposed by the people themselves upon their inherent lawmaking 
power.”134  Prior to the 1968 Constitution, counties only derived home rule 
authority as directly granted from the Florida Legislature, and did not have 
any independent powers of government.135  As such, the pre-1968 home rule 
power is more properly referred to as a grant of home rule power, while the 
post-1968 home rule is more properly referred to as an inherent power of 
self-governance, limited by the Florida Constitution and general law.136 
Therefore, charter counties can exercise all the powers of local self-
governance, as long as such exercises are not inconsistent with the Florida 
Constitution, or general law as passed by the Florida Legislature.137 
                                                            
131. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g)). 
132. Id.; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g). 
133. 964 So. 2d 847, 853–54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
134. Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 315 (Fla. 1930) (emphasis added). 
135. Wolff, supra note 48, at 860; see also FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, § 
27. 
136. Compare FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III § 27, with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 
1(g).  State constitutions themselves are seen as “limitations on the inherent sovereign power 
of states created by the people of that state.”  Mitchell W. Berger & Candice D. Tobin, 
Election 2000:  The Law of Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA L. REV. 647, 691 (2002).  A 
constitutional scheme such as that which exists in Florida, under which there is “‘a direct 
constitutional devolution of substantive home rule powers [to a county] dependent only upon 
the adoption of a home rule charter,’” is more properly characterized as a limitation upon 
inherent power, rather than a grant of power.  Williams, supra note 49, at 222. 
137. Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted 
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 
(Fla. 2012). 
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B. Supreme Court of Florida Decision 
Oddly enough, the Supreme Court of Florida based its decision in 
Telli on the fact that it agreed with Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II.138  
However, Justice Anstead’s statement regarding county home rule power 
does not support the Court’s conclusion: 
 
I cannot agree with the majority that the Florida 
Constitution prohibits charter counties from enacting term 
limits for county officers.  To the contrary, the constitution 
explicitly grants broad authority to charter counties over 
charter officers, and, consistent with that grant, imposes no 
restrictions on a county’s authority to regulate those 
officers.139 
 
With the exception of calling county home rule power a grant, 
Justice Anstead’s statement is correct.140  Charter counties have full authority 
to regulate charter officers.141  Several cases have held so.142 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Snipes v. Telli143—the lower 
court decision preceding Telli—alluded to this conclusion in its well-
reasoned distinction between the Constitution’s County Officers, listed in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and County Commissioners, listed in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (e).144  However, the Supreme Court of 
Florida in Telli completely steamrolled this distinction, paying little attention 
or granting any lip service at all to the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 
analysis, simply noting that it was unworkable without much more 
discussion.145  Accordingly, we must disagree firmly, but respectfully, with 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion, as the distinction and holding of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in Snipes—which is well thought-out and 
supported—correctly reflects the status of the Constitution’s County 
Officers, as opposed to a local charter’s county officers, namely County 
                                                            
138. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); see 
also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 95–96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
139. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
140. See id. 
141. See Dade Cnty. v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822, 823–24 (Fla. 1963). 
142. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; Demings v. 
Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 611 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
143. 67 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. 
Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012). 
144. Id. at 417–19; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 1(d)–(e). 
145. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); see 
also Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417–19; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–96. 
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Commissioners, and logically aligns the procedural and substantive history 
leading up to the Court’s previous decision in Cook II.146 
1. The Telli Decision is in Direct Contradiction to the Provisions of 
Article VIII, Section 1, Subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution 
As the constitutional provision currently stands, charter counties can 
take no action to interfere with any of the Constitution’s County Officers 
under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), except as discussed above that a 
county may choose a different manner in which such officers will be 
chosen.147  This provision simply means that a charter county may use a 
different procedure for choosing the Constitution’s County Officers.148  
However, the option exists whereby the electors of the county may—either 
by charter or special law—abolish the Constitution’s County Office when all 
of the duties are transferred to another charter-created office, the charter’s 
office.149  The county could then regulate the charter-created office however 
it so pleases, as stated above by Justice Anstead because it is that charter’s 
office, and not the Constitution’s Office.150  However, until such time as the 
Constitution’s County Office is abolished and all of its duties transferred, a 
charter county cannot interfere with the Constitution’s County Office and 
therefore, any provisions in the county charter pertaining to the 
Constitution’s County Officer would be unenforceable.151 
The Cook II and Telli opinions—and their predecessors—analyze 
and argue extensively over whether or not article VI, section 4, subsection 
(b)152—which establishes that certain offices under the Constitution are term 
                                                            
146. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417–19. 
147. 081-7 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 21 (1981); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
 148. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
149. Id. 
150. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also supra Part 
III.B. 
151. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
152. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b). 
 Section 4. Disqualifications.— 
. . . . 
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to 
any of the following offices: 
(1) Florida representative, 
(2) Florida senator, 
(3) Florida Lieutenant governor, 
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet, 
(5) U.S. Representative from Florida, or 
(6) U.S. Senator from Florida 
if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will 
have served—or, but for resignation, would have served—in 
that office for eight consecutive years. 
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limited—expressly establishes that all other offices within the Constitution 
may not be term limited, by virtue of not being included in the article VI, 
section 4, subsection (b) list.153  However, article VI, section 4, subsection 
(b) is actually a moot point on this issue.154  Even assuming that this 
provision did not exist in the Florida Constitution, or assuming that its 
adverse implication does not apply to article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) 
officers, a term limit provision within a county charter could not be 
enforceable against any one of the Constitution’s article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d) County Officers if that office has not been abolished and its 
duties transferred to a charter office, simply based on the fact that county 
charters cannot regulate or interfere with the Constitution’s County 
Officers.155 
A contrary holding, such as that established in Telli, completely 
undermines the distinction in the Florida Constitution between the 
Constitution’s County Officers and a charter-created officer—the charter’s 
office—that performs the same duties previously carried out by the 
Constitution’s County Officers.156  The holding also completely undermines 
and breaks down the status of the Constitution’s County Officers as officers 
who perform important state work locally, and, because imbued with 
sovereignty, are shielded from undue influence and control of the county, 
and only accountable to the electorate.157 
Placing term limits on any of the five Constitution County Officers 
would be an interference with, and control over the Constitution’s County 
Officer, in direct derogation of the Constitution.158  Although the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Pinellas County v. Eight is Enough in 
Pinellas159—one of the lower court consolidated cases preceding Cook II—
found that the charter term limit at issue in that case would not affect the 
status, duties, or responsibilities of the Constitution’s County Officers,160 a 
term limit would actually affect the status of the Constitution’s County 
                                                                                                                                            
Id. 
153. Id.; Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512–513 (Fla 2012) (per 
curium); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90, 94–95; Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 416–17 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), 
aff’d per curium, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012); Cook I, 765 So. 2d 289, 290, 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 
(Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002). 
154. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b). 
155. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); supra Part II.C.2. 
156. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13. 
157. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13. 
158. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512. 
159. 775 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted, 786 So. 2d 1188 
(Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002). 
160. Id. at 319; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2002). 
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Officers, who enjoy sovereign authority and plenary power, separate from 
the control of the county governing board.161  Allowing charter counties to 
term limit the Constitution’s County Officers, gives the charter county’s 
governing board a source of leverage and control over the Constitution’s 
County Officers.162  For example, if a charter county’s governing board does 
not agree with the actions of an incumbent Tax Collector, the charter 
county’s governing board might attempt to pass a term limit provision in the 
county’s charter, which would prohibit the incumbent Tax Collector from 
being able to run for reelection the following term and remain in office.163  
Additionally, the governing board might be able to maintain leverage over 
the Constitution’s County Tax Collector by simply threatening to pass a 
charter term limit if the Constitution’s County Tax Collector does not take 
actions in its favor.164  This kind of interference and control is exactly what 
was intended to be avoided by having the Constitution’s County Officers 
maintain an independence and sovereignty separate from any possible 
influence or control of the local county governing body.165 
Furthermore, the holding in Cook II also renders the language in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) that “‘any county office may be 
abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by general law are 
transferred to another office,’” as mere surplusage.166  If counties, under their 
charters, had full authority to regulate and control the Constitution’s County 
Officers, there would be no need for the language regarding abolition and 
transfer.167  Although charter counties have the power to impose term limits 
on county officers once they have become the charter’s officers, and no 
longer the Constitution’s sovereign County Officers, it is improper to 
conclude, as Justice Anstead did, that this procedure can be side-stepped: 
 
I can find no legal justification for concluding that charter counties 
should not be allowed to ask their citizens to vote on eligibility 
requirements of local elected officials, including term-limits, since 
they could abolish the offices completely or decide to select the 
officers in any manner of their choosing.168 
 
                                                            
161. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
162. See id. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2002) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 
1(d)). 
 167. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90. 
168. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 1(d). 
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Allowing charter counties to term limit the Constitution’s County 
Officers before their offices have been abolished and transferred to a 
charter’s office is an illegal means of achieving a result that would be legal 
under different means, and allowing such regulation and control will upset 
the balance of power struck by the Constitution.169  In a word, the Telli 
decision is alarming in ignoring base provisions of the Florida 
Constitution.170 
a. Additional Critiques of Reliance on Justice Anstead’s Dissent in 
Cook II 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Telli based its holding on its 
agreement with Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II.171  Part of Justice 
Anstead’s reason for finding that article VI, section 4, subsection (b) did not 
prohibit charter counties from implementing term limits on any and all of its 
county officers—the Constitution’s County Officers and County 
Commissioners—was that the offices in that section for which term limits are 
listed expressly are offices of statewide importance.172  As such, he 
concluded that the provision should have no bearing whatsoever on local 
officers.173  However, this statement fails to acknowledge the distinction 
between the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers listed in and 
created by article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and that of other local 
officers who perform exclusively local duties—namely County 
Commissioners—and the fact that the work that the Constitution’s five 
County Officers perform is in fact work of statewide importance 
implemented and carried out on the county level.174 
Additionally, this distinction also undermines Justice Anstead’s 
second reason for finding that article VI, section 4, subsection (b) cannot 
prohibit the implementation of term limits in charter counties for all county 
officers whether it be the Constitution’s County Officers, the charter’s 
                                                            
169. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
170. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 
513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
 171. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., 
dissenting). 
172. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b). 
173. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b). 
174. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 
2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012). 
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county officers, or County Commissioners.175  Justice Anstead noted that 
“there is no wording in article VI, section 4, [subsection] (b)—or anywhere 
else in the Florida Constitution or the Florida Statutes—that indicates that the 
named officers in article VI, section 4, [subsection] (b) are subject to term 
limits to the exclusion of all other government officers, state or local, in the 
State of Florida.”176  However, there is also no wording in article VI, section 
4, subsection (b) to indicate that the specific disqualifications and election 
provisions should apply exclusively to those offices of specific statewide 
importance.177  In fact, sections 6 and 7 of article VI contain wording 
indicating that the provisions in those sections expressly apply only to 
municipal or district elections and statewide elections, respectively.178  This 
wording is evidence that the Constitution drafters know how to write 
provisions expressly applicable to only certain offices and or elections, and if 
they so intended for article VI, section 4, subsection (b) to apply only to 
offices of statewide importance as defined by Justice Anstead, they would 
have expressly noted that restriction.179 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion in Telli, and its 
reliance on Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II, fails to acknowledge and 
undermines the Constitution’s specific distinction that exists between the 
Constitution’s five County Officers listed in article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d), and the County Commissioners listed in article VIII, section 
1, subsection (e).180  The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal made a 
                                                            
 175. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b)(1)–(6); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418. 
176. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b). 
177. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 
512 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
178. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6–7. 
 Section 6.  Municipal and district elections.—Registration 
and elections in municipalities shall, and in other governmental entities 
created by statute may, be provided by law. 
 Section 7.  Campaign spending limits and funding of 
campaigns for elective state-wide office.—It is the policy of this state to 
provide for state-wide elections in which all qualified candidates may 
compete effectively.  A method of public financing for campaigns for 
state-wide office shall be established by law.  Spending limits shall be 
established for such campaigns for candidates who use public funds in 
their campaigns.  The legislature shall provide funding for this 
provision.  General law implementing this paragraph shall be at least as 
protective of effective competition by a candidate who uses public funds 
as the general law in effect on January 1, 1998. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b)(1)–(6). 
 180. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Cook II, 823 
So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
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detailed analysis of these two sets of offices in the lower court decision of 
Snipes.181  First, the court noted that the structure of the two sets of offices is 
distinctly different under article VIII, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, 
specifically with regards to changes to be made by a county charter.182  The 
court noted that “[t]he section 1, [subsection] (d) officers are established with 
precise language . . . .  [The section] establishe[d] that a county government 
shall have certain named officers, and grants the county limited powers to 
change the manner of electing those officers, or to abolish an office 
altogether and transfer its duties to another county office.”183  In contrast, 
“the section 1, [subsection] (e) commissioners are described as a default 
option when a county charter does not provide otherwise.”184  Section 1, 
subsection (d) requires each county to have the five Constitution County 
Officers, and is followed by language that authorizes a limited way in which 
a county by charter may abolish the Constitution’s County Office and 
transfer its duties to a charter-created office, the charter’s office.185  
Conversely, section 1, subsection (e) does not require that the composition of 
the Board of County Commissioners be set up in the way enumerated in the 
Constitution; it is simply a default.186  By beginning section 1, subsection (e) 
with the words “‘[e]xcept when otherwise provided by county charter, . . . .’ 
[t]he language of the Constitution expressly cedes power to a county charter 
when it comes to the creation of a county’s collegial governing body.”187 
Additionally, the court went on to discuss the practicality of the 
Constitution preferring statewide uniformity for section 1, subsection (d) 
officers.188  This practicality argument is further bolstered by the fact that the 
Constitution’s five County Officers perform important statewide work on the 
county level, which is intended to be free of interference or influence of the 
                                                            
181. Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 417–19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g 
granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 
3d 504 (Fla. 2012); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e). 
 182. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
183. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  
184. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e). 
185. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417. 
186. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); see also Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417. 
187. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 1(e)). 
188. Id. at 418 (“Persons traveling and doing business between counties should 
deal with a common set of section 1, [subsection] (d) county officers, i.e., sheriff, tax 
collector, property appraiser, supervisor of elections, clerk of the circuit court, and should not 
be forced to navigate byzantine bureaucracies to accomplish similar tasks.  Likewise, 
legislators seeking to regulate section 1, [subsection] (d) county officers should not be forced 
to take a variety of different titles and job descriptions into account in order to achieve a single 
legislative objective.”); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
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local county governing board.189  Conversely, the court notes that “these 
reasons for statewide uniformity are less applicable to the county’s 
[collegial] governing body,” whose duties “need not be kept uniform by the 
Constitution, but may rather be fashioned to suit the particular wants and 
needs of the voters of the county they serve.”190  The difference in status in 
the Florida Constitution between these two groups of officers “reflects the 
common sense conclusion that, as a matter of policy, the balance of state and 
local interests favors statewide uniformity for the [Constitution’s five County 
Officers], and local flexibility for the [governing Board of County 
Commissioners].”191 
The precise language in article VIII, section 1, subsection (e), 
“[e]xcept when otherwise provided by county charter,” represents the shift in 
power and authority that resulted from the 1968 Constitution denoting broad 
county home rule powers.192  Accordingly, prior to this change, even County 
Commissioners were considered constitution officers,193 the election and 
qualifications of whom could not be changed.194  However, this consideration 
is no longer true under the 1968 Constitution in charter counties that have 
established the form of its governing Board of County Commissioners under 
its charter, rather than utilizing the fallback option listed in article VIII, 
section 1, subsection (e).195  Once a charter county decides to establish and to 
regulate its governing board under its charter, the County Commissioners are 
local charter county officers, who—as Justice Anstead pointed out in his 
dissent in Cook II—the charter county has the power and authority to 
regulate.196  It is under this distinction and analysis that the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Snipes held that the holding of Cook II did not extend to 
County Commissioners, and that charter term limits for those offices are 
permissible under the Florida Constitution.197 
                                                            
189. See supra Part II.C. 
190. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e). 
191. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).  
 192. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added), with FLA. 
CONST., art. VIII, § 1(e) (amended 1973). 
193. State v. Walton Cnty., 112 So. 630, 632 (Fla. 1927) (“[T]he board of 
county commissioners of each county are constitutional officers, and under the terms of the 
Constitution their powers and duties shall be fixed and prescribed by the Legislature.”). 
194. See Wilson v. Newell, 223 So. 2d 734, 735 n.2 (Fla. 1969) (quoting FLA. 
CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, § 5 (1943)). 
195. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (e), (g). 
196. Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 95–96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting); see 
also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e), (g). 
197. Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted 
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 
(Fla. 2012); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (e); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95. 
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However, the Supreme Court of Florida in its review of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal’s decision failed to even analyze this distinction.198  
In its decision, the Court simply recapped the two lower court consolidated 
decisions and its previous decision in Cook II, then simply noted that it no 
longer agreed with its previous decision, and would recede from it because it 
now agreed with Justice Anstead’s dissent.199  Rather than analyzing 
specifically why the distinction drawn by the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
was erroneous, the Court simply noted that it was unworkable and “would 
undermine the ability to predict what offices may be included within the 
scope of [Cook II’s] prohibition on term-limits and would result in apparent 
inconsistencies between county officials.”200  However, we firmly and 
respectfully disagree with the Court’s hasty, careless, unreasoned, and 
alarming conclusion about the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding.201  
Based on the procedural and substantive history of the previous decisions 
involved in the Cook II case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding is 
clear and logically aligns the past precedent.202 
As correctly noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the 
holding of Cook II only expressly applied to the Constitution’s five County 
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d).203  The first 
case that Cook II reviewed was Cook I.204  This case was a challenge by the 
Clerk of Court for Duval County to a City of Jacksonville charter term limit 
provision.205  The second case was Eight is Enough in Pinellas.206  This case 
                                                            
198. See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512–13 (Fla. 2012) (per 
curiam); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 419. 
199. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 
(Arnstead, J., dissenting). 
200. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; Snipes, 67 
So. 3d at 419. 
201. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 419. 
202. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 87–90; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416, 419. 
203. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook II, 
823 So. 2d at 94–95. 
204. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 87; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416; see also Cook I, 765 
So. 2d 289, 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook v. City of 
Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002). 
205. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 88; Cook I, 765 So. 2d at 290.  The challenge was 
to the City of Jacksonville Charter, rather than a county charter because under the Florida 
Constitution, the City of Jacksonville currently operates “in the place of any or all county . . . 
government[].”  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) n.1; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 88.  This section also 
contains a similar provision as article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), regarding abolition of the 
Constitution’s County Officers, which states:  “No county office shall be abolished or 
consolidated with another office without making provision for the performance of all state 
duties now or hereafter prescribed by law to be performed by such county officer.”  Compare 
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) n.1, with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  Contrary to the belief of 
many—Duval County is not a charter county.  See FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 6 n. 1.  There is no 
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began with a resident of the county seeking declaratory judgment that a 
charter provision implementing term limits for the Constitution’s five County 
Officers as well as the County Commissioners was invalid.207  The trial court 
found the provisions valid and, thereafter, the Constitution’s five County 
Officers intervened as plaintiffs.208  The trial court upheld the provision and 
the resident, the Constitution County Officers, and the county itself, 
appealed.209  The Second District affirmed the trial court.210  “The incumbent 
[C]lerk of . . . [C]ourt, [T]ax [C]ollector, and [S]heriff petitioned [the 
Supreme Court of Florida] for review, but the [B]oard of [C]ounty 
[C]ommissioners did not.”211  The Fourth District in Snipes correctly noted 
that the failure of the County Commissioners to petition for review of the 
Second District’s decision was significant “because it had the effect of 
removing that office from the holding of [Cook II].”212  Interestingly enough, 
the Supreme Court of Florida conveniently failed to include this fact in its 
opinion in Telli.213 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida in Cook II could not have 
been more clear and express about the fact that it was only reviewing the 
validity of term limit provisions on the Constitution’s five County Officers 
enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d).214  The Court phrased 
the issue in the case as such from the very outset of the opinion.215  Given the 
foregoing analysis, we would firmly and respectfully disagree with the 
careless and irresponsible conclusion of the Court in Telli, that unworkable 
                                                                                                                                            
Duval County government.  See id.  There is no consolidated government, and if and when the 
electors of Duval County vote in, or have an election to approve a county charter, the city of 
Jacksonville, by operation of law, will no longer act in operation and in place of the county 
government.  See id. 
206. Pinellas Cnty. v. Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So. 2d 317, 317 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted, 786 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 
86 (Fla. 2002). 
207. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 510 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
208. Id. at 510–11; Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So. 2d at 318. 
209. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 510–11. 
210. Id. at 511. 
211. Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted 
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 
(Fla. 2012). 
212. Id.; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 94–95 (Fla. 2002). 
213. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506–13. 
214. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90–91; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 1(d). 
215. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90. 
The issue we address in these consolidated cases is whether a charter 
county may in its charter impose a “term limit” provision upon those county officer 
positions which are authorized by article VIII, section 1, [subsection] (d), Florida 
Constitution, where the charter county through its charter has not abolished those 
county officer positions. 
Id. 
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confusion will result as to which officers the Cook II decision would 
apply.216 
This is not to say that even under Cook II, charter counties have no 
power whatsoever to term limit its officers.217  Charter counties still have the 
ability to abolish any of the Constitution’s five County Officers listed in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and transfer the duties to a separate 
charter-created office, which it could then term limit in the same manner that 
it can term limit its charter governing board and any other charter officers.218  
The officers would then be the charter’s non-sovereign county officers, and 
no longer the Constitution’s sovereign County Officers.219  This distinction 
was also made in Cook II, as the issue posed specifically addressed the 
section 1, subsection (d), County Officers, “where the charter county through 
its charter has not abolished those county officer positions.”220  The Court in 
Cook II held that term limits could only be imposed on constitutional—that 
is, not-yet-abolished—County Officers through an amendment to the 
Constitution.221 
IV. PATHWAYS TO REVIEW:  WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE?222 
While the pathway for review in attempting to correct the Telli 
decision is rather limited and bleak, there are some methods available by 
which one could attempt to get the decision revisited and hopefully 
overturned by the Supreme Court of Florida.223  It is important to note that a 
state’s supreme court is the final and ultimate arbiter on issues of state law.224  
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida is the final arbiter of the state 
constitutional law issues involved in Telli, and the trial courts and district 
courts of appeal are bound to follow the Telli decision until such time as it is 
overruled by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court.225  However, this 
does not mean that one could not argue a case on the same issue back up to 
the Supreme Court of Florida, on the premise that the Telli decision was 
                                                            
216. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95. 
217. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90. 
218. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e), (g); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90, 94–95. 
219. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95. 
220. Id. at 90 (emphasis added). 
221. Id. at 94–95. 
222. This list of pathways to review is by no means all-inclusive. 
223. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a); Telli v. Broward 
Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
224. E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406, 
1413 (11th Cir. 1997). 
225. See Nielson, 116 F.3d at 1413; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
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decided erroneously and in direct derogation of the Florida Constitution.226  
There are several different options for getting the issue back to the Supreme 
Court of Florida.227 
A. Constitutional Amendment 
One option would be for a constitutional amendment to be passed 
which would clarify the status of the Constitution’s County Officers, and 
make it explicit that no actions could be taken to interfere with—including 
placing term limits on—the Constitution’s County Officers, until and unless 
their offices have been abolished and duties transferred to a charter-created 
office.228  The Florida Constitution sets out several different ways to propose 
and pass amendments to the Florida Constitution.229  However, we believe 
that a constitutional amendment is unnecessary.  The Florida Constitution 
does not need to be amended in this situation; its plain language simply 
needs to be followed.230  We believe that the limited powers and authority of 
charter counties to regulate or control the Constitution’s County Officers is 
clear from the plain language of the Florida Constitution as it stands.231 
B. Review of District Court of Appeal Decision 
The second option for getting back to the Supreme Court of Florida 
would be through review of a district court of appeal decision.232  Under this 
option, one would have to bring a case in a Florida circuit court.233  As noted 
above, the Florida circuit courts are bound by Supreme Court precedence, 
and so any circuit court would be bound to rule that charter term limits for 
any or all of the Constitution’s County Officers are constitutionally 
permissible based on Telli.234  However, an appeal could then be taken and 
heard by a district court of appeal.235  The district court of appeal would also 
be bound to follow Telli, and therefore would affirm the trial court’s 
                                                            
226. See Weinger, supra note 7, at 868–71; see also Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
227. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii), 
(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
228. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), (g). 
229. FLA. CONST. art. XI. 
230. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g). 
231. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
232. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). 
233. Id. § 4(b)(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). 
234. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 
(Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
235. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1) (“District courts of appeal shall have 
jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or 
orders of trial courts . . . .”). 
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judgment.236  The party could then petition the Supreme Court of Florida for 
review; however, the case would fall into the category of cases for which the 
Supreme Court of Florida only has discretionary review,237 so there is no 
guarantee that the Court would hear the case.238  It could just as easily decide 
not to, based on the fact that it has just recently issued the Telli opinion.239 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Florida would have discretion to 
review the case if a district court of appeal certifies a question to be of great 
public importance that it has passed upon.240  The Supreme Court of Florida 
could also immediately hear a review of the trial court judgment—of which 
appeal is pending—if a district court of appeal certifies the case “to be of 
great public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper 
administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to require 
immediate resolution by the [S]upreme [C]ourt.”241 
C. Writ of Quo Warranto 
A writ of quo warranto is “used to test the right of a person either to 
hold an office . . . or to exercise some right or privilege.”242  Under the 
Florida Statutes, a person who claims the right to hold public office may 
bring a petition for writ of quo warranto if the Attorney General refuses to 
bring the petition.243  The Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction to hear 
petitions for writs of quo warranto, challenging the right of a person to hold 
state office.244  The Supreme Court of Florida has previously held that the 
title state officer under this provision “contemplates possession or use[] of a 
certain portion of sovereignty for the benefit of the people.”245  Because the 
Constitution’s County Officers are sovereign officers, they are also subject to 
                                                            
236. See id.; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
237. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).  Under this option, the Supreme Court of 
Florida could review the District Court’s decision based on the fact that it “expressly 
construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of 
constitutional or state officers.”  Id.  Because of the constitutional issues involved in the case, 
conflict between more than one district is not necessary for discretionary Supreme Court 
review.  See id. 
238. See id. 
239. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
240. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). 
241. Id. § 3(b)(5). 
242. Tracy Raffles Gunn, Original Proceedings in Florida’s Appellate Courts, 
32 STETSON L. REV. 347, 354 (2003). 
243. FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2014). 
244. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8) (The Supreme Court of Florida “[m]ay issue 
writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers and state agencies.”). 
245. Ex parte Smith, 118 So. 306, 307 (Fla. 1928). 
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a writ of quo warranto from the Supreme Court of Florida.246  Therefore, this 
would be a viable method for getting this issue back to the Supreme Court of 
Florida directly, but one would have to wait for several things to occur 
before bringing such a petition.247 
First, a charter county would have to pass a charter term limit 
applicable to one or more of the Constitution’s County Officers.248  Second, 
an incumbent Constitution County Officer would have to be denied the 
ability to run in the next election following the passage of the charter term 
limit.249  Third, and related, a new Constitution County Officer would be 
elected and would take office.250  At this point, the incumbent Constitution 
County Officer—who was denied the ability to run for office again—would 
have the right to petition the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of quo 
warranto, challenging the newly-elected Constitution County Officer’s right 
to hold that office.251  The incumbent Constitution County Officer would 
have a claim to that office because had the charter term limit provision not 
been enacted—in derogation of the Florida Constitution—he or she would 
have been able to run again, and possibly would have been reelected.252  
However, the Supreme Court of Florida’s jurisdiction for hearing a petition 
for a writ of quo warranto is discretionary as well, so again, there is no 
guarantee that the Court would hear the petition.253 
Similarly, because a writ of quo warranto can also be used to 
challenge an exercise of authority derived from a public office,254 the writ 
could also possibly be used to challenge the authority of a charter review 
committee to consider and propose charter term limits for the Constitution’s 
County Officers.255  However, the jurisdiction for this particular writ would 
fall in the circuit court,256 the decision of which would then have to be 
appealed up to a Florida district court of appeal—just like any other case—
and would not be guaranteed review by the Supreme Court of Florida.257 
                                                            
246. See id. 
247. See id. 
248. See, e.g., Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505–06 (Fla. 2012) (per 
curiam). 
249. Id. at 506. 
250. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 74 So. 3d at 506. 
251. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8); FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2014); see also Ex 
parte Smith, 118 So. at 307. 
252. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
253. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8). 
254. See Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1338–39 (Fla. 1989). 
255. See Weinger, supra note 7, at 868. 
256. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(c)(3). 
257. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(3), 4(b)(3); supra Parts II–IV. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal’s decision and reasoning in Snipes should have been affirmed in 
Telli.258  Under the Florida Constitution, charter counties have broad 
authority to regulate their County Commissioners fully, and therefore, the 
authority exists to set term limits for them within the county charter.259  
Conversely, there is only very limited and specific authority for counties to 
regulate the Constitution’s five County Officers under their charters.260  That 
is, specifically, a county may only establish a different manner in which 
these officers shall be chosen under the county charter; and as long as a 
charter county has not abolished the Constitution’s County Office and 
transferred its duties to a charter-created office—the charter’s office—it 
remains the Constitution’s County Officer’s, and charter counties possess no 
more power than non-charter counties to regulate them.261  This point of law 
means that charter counties possess no more power than non-charter counties 
to set term limits for the Constitution’s five County Officers.262 
The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Telli failed to take into 
account the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers, completely 
abridging the distinction drawn by the Constitution between a Constitution’s 
County Officer and a charter’s county officer, and therefore, illegally and 
without authority or jurisdiction, has effectuated an amendment to the 
Florida Constitution, which it does not possess the power to effectuate.263  
Only the people of Florida can effectuate an amendment to the Florida 
Constitution through an amendment election vote.264  The Telli opinion 
unconstitutionally abridges the rights of both incumbent holders of the 
Constitution’s County Offices and of the voters who may wish to vote for 
those incumbent Constitution County Officers.265  For this reason, the 
opinion is untenable, disconcerting, not judicially cognizant, devoid of 
constitutional integrity, and, if enforced, precipitates needlessly an 
                                                            
258. See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); 
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. 
Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012); 
Weinger, supra note 7, at 860, 870. 
259. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e), (g). 
260. Id. § 1(g). 
261. See id. § 1(e)–(g). 
262. See id. § 1(f)–(g). 
263. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Weinger, supra 
note 7, at 869–70. 
264. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b), (e). 
265. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Weinger, supra 
note 7, at 868–70. 
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unnervingly serious constitutional problem, which must be solved.266  There 
is a dire need for the issue to make its way back to the Supreme Court of 
Florida for reconsideration of the constitutional implications of the Telli 
decision.  If not revisited, there will soon be officers elected and sworn into 
sovereign state office in derogation of the Florida Constitution.  If the issue 
does in fact make its way back to the discretionary jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of Florida, one would hope that the Court would exercise its 
discretion in favor of hearing the issue, if only to correct the dire 
constitutional issues placed before it; and then, also to correct a careless and 
unsupported opinion that is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s well-earned 
respect as one of the best state supreme courts in the United States of 
America. 
 
                                                            
 266. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13. 
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